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This paper offers a very good and fair appraisal from a U.S. perspective of the 
background to and prospects for international negotiations on reducing emissions of 
greenhouse gases.  The paper’s insights benefit from the authors’ first-hand 
experience of participating in policy formation, which has led them to extol the 
virtues of creative ambiguity in international negotiations.  It concludes, that there 
will be, in David Victor’s phrase, “variable geometries in participation” in future 
collective action to mitigate climate change.  This analysis recognises that there is 
room for “coalitions of the willing” and the evolution of broader-based collective 
action over time.  It leads to a more sophisticated and nuanced conclusion than the 
recently-popular claim that the search for global top-down agreements is likely to be 
replaced by bottom-up measures by citizens’ groups and nation states in isolation. 
 
As far as the ultimate prospects for halting human-induced climate change is 
concerned, the authors are perhaps surprisingly optimistic at a time when global 
greenhouse gas emissions may be rising faster than ever
2 and revised long-run 
prospects for emerging-market economies are outweighing the depressing effect of 
the world’s economic slowdown.
3  They write that “it is our view that the United 
States will eventually enact comprehensive climate legislation… Even Kyoto 
critics… concede that they will most likely result from a strong, broad-based 
agreement with legally binding targets.... The vast majority of U.S. industry would be 
largely unaffected by carbon regulation in the short run.” 
 
I want to discuss four issues that the paper raises in my mind.  First, what is one to 
make of the apparent conflict between simple economic logic and political reality that 
the authors suggest exists?  Second, what will the key lines of fracture be among 
nations in future as they grapple with anthropogenic climate change?  Third, what are 
the costs and benefits of a gradual ramp up policy versus a ‘big bang’?  And, finally, 
what are the consequences of the ‘variable geometries’ approach? 
 
The apparent conflict between simple economic logic and political reality 
 
                                                 
1 Principal Research Fellow, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, email a.bowen1@lse.ac.uk . 
2 The International Energy Agency estimates energy-related carbon dioxide emissions to have 
increased by over 5% from 2009 to 2010 (press release, 30 May 2011). 
3 See Blanford et al (2009). The authors suggest that while simple economic logic might argue for a global unified 
approach, political reality points toward a future of fragmented carbon regimes.  This 
echoes Elinor Ostrom, who in a recent paper for the World Bank, discusses what she 
calls a “polycentric approach” for coping with climate change (Ostrom, 2009).  Like 
Branstetter and Pizer, she notes that “The classic theory of collective action predicts 
that no one will change behavior and reduce their energy use unless an external 
authority imposes enforceable rules that change the incentives faced by those 
involved.”  But she goes on to point out that “Two broad grounds exist for doubting 
whether sole reliance on the conventional theory of collective action is a wise 
scientific strategy.  The first is the weakness of empirical support for the conventional 
theory of collective action… The second is the existence of multiple externalities at 
small, medium, and large scales within the global externality that has been of primary 
concern in the academic and policy literature.” 
 
Charles Kolstad (2011) also takes issue with apparently simple economic logic, 
drawing attention to the apparent willingness of individual countries to go it alone in 
tackling trans-border environmental issues in the absence of a comprehensive 
international environmental agreement.  He observes that experiments to examine the 
incidence of free-riding, together with casual empiricism in the real world, suggest 
that far more co-operation takes place than conventional theory would predict.  But if 
one broadens the concept of utility to allow for the possibility of ‘impure altruism’ 
(Andreoni, 1990), these empirical observations make more sense.  There may be 
much more scope for international climate co-operation than conventional economic 
wisdom suggests.   
 
Certainly, it is striking that a substantial range of climate-change mitigation actions 
are being planned by small countries, both developed and developing, without an 
overarching legally binding agreement being in place (or, indeed, even on the 
horizon).  By some calculations, pledges before and immediately after the 
Copenhagen Conference of 2009 amounted to pledges to cut emissions by some 15% 
from business-as-usual levels by 2020 (Stern and Taylor, 2010).  Admittedly, these 
pledges are not legally binding, but they were unlikely to have been made without the 
conference to concentrate minds and cast the glare of international publicity over 
countries’ aspirations.  So perhaps there is good reason for a degree of optimism 
about the future growth of such  policies  The more general message is that if simple 
economic logic appears to contradict political reality, it is a good idea to review the 
apparent logic – and the choice of axioms and simplifications used to model economic 
actors’ behaviour. 
 
What will the key lines of fracture be among nations in future? 
 
That brings me to the next issue:  who are the key economic actors and what are their 
interests?  I was rather surprised at this paper’s focus on the divide between developed 
and developing countries and emphasis on the West versus the rest.  That may make 
sense if one is sticking to a global, top-down view of nation states attempting to 
negotiate a global agreement and it reflects the Kyoto Protocol distinction between 
Annex 1 countries and the rest.  But in a more polyvalent world of variable 
geometries, one might well want to look beyond the veil of the nation state and ask, 
how would various climate-change policies affect returns to capital, labour, and owners of various natural resources, and how are these factors of production 
distributed across countries? 
 
In the climate-change domain, the distribution of ownership of fossil-fuel resources is 
a key issue.  I am struck by how one piece of simple economic logic, Hotelling’s 
insight into the pricing of exhaustible natural resources, has barely been taken on 
board in the climate-change policy literature, despite having a long pedigree in the 
theory – for example, it is not discussed in the JEL article that Branstetter and Pizer 
cite (Aldy et al, 2010).  But back in the 1980s, Hans-Werner Sinn introduced the 
‘green paradox’ by which efforts to support renewable energy development might 
accelerate fossil fuel depletion and increase emissions (see discussion in Sinn, 2008).  
The relevance of exhaustible resource theory for climate change has been elaborated 
by a number of authors, such as Michael Hoel (2009) in a fascinating paper entitled 
‘Bush meets Hotelling.’ 
 
Yet OPEC and Russia have in some sense been the ‘dog that didn’t bark’ in 
international negotiations.  If world carbon prices follow the trajectory integrated 
assessment models suggest is necessary to keep below the 2°C ceiling on global 
temperature increase to which the vast majority of countries have signed up, fossil 
fuel prices will be depressed.  As a recent EBRD report explained very clearly 
(EBRD, 2011), the oil and gas exporters of the former Soviet Union stand to lose a 
huge amount from adverse changes in their terms of trade.  And the integrated 
assessment models may themselves underestimate the height to which carbon prices 
may have to rise to choke off fossil-fuel consumption.  As far as I am aware, hardly 
any of them incorporate a Hotelling effect in their structure.   
 
I would therefore have liked to have heard more from the authors about the role of 
fossil-fuel interests in international climate-change policy-making – not just OPEC’s 
and Russia’s roles in international negotiations but, for example, the role of coal 
owners in U.S. climate-change politics.  That role is pertinent to the question of 
whether Europe and the U.S.A. are likely to be on the same side of the policy divide 
in future or whether Europe will be lining up with other fossil-fuel-poor countries 
against countries such as the U.S.A, Canada, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Australia.  
More generally, economic analysis of international policy should consider who the 
key stake-holders are and what motivates them, looking behind the veil of the nation 
state if necessary.  In effect, that is what Heckscher, Ohlin and Samuelson did in 
international trade theory. 
 
Comparing "ramp up policy gently" and going for a ‘big bang’? 
 
That links to the third issue that I want to raise.  The authors argue that standard 
economic analysis suggests that the efficient pricing path involves setting carbon 
prices relatively low to begin with, but rising over time.  But the natural resource 
pricing literature suggests that one may have to start with much higher carbon prices, 
high enough to drive fossil-fuel rents to zero.  Even if one regards the Hotelling-based 
argument as a theoretical curiosity, despite the empirical insights to which it has given 
rise, there is a debate to be had over what ‘relatively low’ means.   
 
If one is a proponent of using a very low pure rate of time preference in discounting 
costs and benefits from public policies, the logic dictates starting with a higher carbon price than otherwise that rises less rapidly thereafter.
4  The transition of the capital 
stock to a low-carbon mix would still be gradual, because of replacement cycles and 
time to build, but it would be faster than with market-interest-rate-based discounting.  
The UK Committee on Climate Change reckons the UK needs a carbon price of £30 
per tonne CO2e by 2020 if the UK is to meet its emission reduction target, which itself 
is designed to be consistent with European commitments to the 2°C ceiling 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2011).  Modelling exercises to calculate price 
trajectories consistent with the 2°C ceiling suggest that a price of anywhere from $13 
to $263 per tonne is necessary by 2020.  This distribution suffers from sample 
selection bias because it excludes the results of studies that imply that it is infeasible 
to keep below the ceiling.  Working back to the present using a real social discount 
rate of, say, 3% (plus a factor to reflect the decay of greenhouse gases from the 
atmosphere) would yield a current carbon price of more than a few dollars.   
 
I concede that, in the immediate future, while many countries face high levels of 
involuntary unemployment, trying to induce rapid structural change is risky.  But 
there are ways in which the economic slowdown can be turned to the advantage of 
climate-change objectives (Bowen and Stern, 2010).  Whether gradually increasing 
the carbon price from a low base, so that people barely notice, is compatible with the 
changes in consumption and investment patterns that would reduce emissions is a 
moot point.  Such an approach might also raise doubts about political commitment to 
the carbon-pricing regime over the long term.  The alternative ‘big bang’ approach 
can be seen as a way of demonstrating commitment and establishing the reputation of 
the policy authorities. 
 
More generally, there is a question of how rapidly to bring in any new international 
policy regime.  Does it make sense to do things by halves?  Do some aspects of the 
regime necessarily require a step change?  The literature on policy reform and 
sequencing after the fall of Soviet communism may have something to teach climate-
change analysts. 
 
Should national policies adopt the ‘variable geometries’ approach? 
 
Finally, there is the question of whether the ‘variable geometries’ approach is 
applicable nationally.  In my view, there are significant dangers in a domestic pick-
and-mix approach to tackling climate change.  Growing recognition of the threat of 
global climate change has drawn attention to several important market and policy 
failures in addition to the central environmental externality of greenhouse gases, 
including spill-overs from innovation, network economies, information asymmetries, 
moral hazard from policy-makers’ difficulties in pre-committing and economically 
inefficient tax systems. 
 
These failures have not now been recognised for the very first time, of course.  But 
their costs now need to be re-assessed.  If the climate threat can galvanise action 
across the board, there is clearly scope for a Pareto-superior outcome, if the 
appropriate side payments – to developing countries and fossil-fuel owners, for 
example – can be arranged.  This is why the World Bank, OECD and others are 
                                                 
4 This is the approach adopted in Stern et al (2007).  It is controversial but has a long pedigree in 
welfare economics. emphasising the virtues of green growth.  But this requires improved policies on 
several fronts.  In this connection, it would have been interesting to learn the authors’ 
views about the state of play in international discussions about low-carbon technology 
transfer, intellectual property rights, trans-national energy infrastructure and 
‘measurement, reporting and verification.’ 
 
However, siren voices have been suggesting that effective mitigation can be brought 
about largely by supporting low-carbon R&D.  The advice is to soft-pedal on carbon 
pricing.  Yet a range of studies (e.g. Fischer and Newell, 2008) make clear that the 
overall costs of mitigation are likely to be much higher if we do not use all the tools in 
the tool-box.  That does not seem like good politics, let alone economics.  And many 
national policy mixes are piecemeal, not designed as a whole and likely to be far from 
cost-effective.  The OECD (2011) has amply made that point with respect to the U.K.  
On some calculations, the implicit carbon price in the U.K. varies across sectors and 
uses from zero to nearly £250 per tonne CO2e. 
 
The fact that this conference is taking place at the Bank of England provokes the 
thought that environmental policy-makers could take a leaf out of the monetary policy 
book to create a more robust and coherent domestic policy mix.  One option would be 
to give a single public authority constrained discretion to pursue national emissions 
targets, using a defined set of delegated policy instruments.  In the U.K., for example, 
the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change could start by handing over 
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